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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines whether the stock market returns surrounding announcements of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) are higher for acquiring firms audited by industry specialists. External 
auditors are uniquely positioned to provide assurance on the financial statements of their 
acquiring clients both before and after an acquisition. Also, an important aspect of due diligence 
in M&A transactions is the external auditor’s review of the accounting records, financial 
statements, internal controls and information systems of the target company. Using a sample of 
4,283 M&A announcements between 1988 and 2011 in the United States of America, we report the 
results from our main regressions, controlling for all the bidder traits and deal characteristics. 
We examine incremental effect of audit firm specialization on cumulative abnormal returns. We 
also measure the effect of audit firm industry specialization in a reduced sample of 3,946 
acquisitions after removing all non-Big N auditors. We use Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure 
to ensure that announcement period return to the size of the audit firm is not driven by the 
determinants related to auditor choice. Consistent with the idea that industry specialists provide 
higher quality assurance and possibly superior M&A advisory services, we find that the stock 
market returns are higher when acquiring firms are audited by industry specialists.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
e examine whether stock market returns are higher in corporate acquisitions for acquiring firms 
audited by industry specialist auditors. We first replicate and confirm results in Louis (2005) 
showing that acquiring firms’ stock market returns are higher when these firms use non-Big 4 
auditors. We then consider the role of auditor industry specialization in value creation in M&A transactions. We find 
an incrementally significant positive stock market reaction during the five days surrounding M&A announcements 
when the acquiring firm is audited by an industry specialist. Our result supports the idea that industry specialist 
auditors add value to acquiring firms by providing high quality assurance, monitoring, and/or advisory services in 
the context of M&A transactions.  
 
Prior research has found that auditors possessing industry specialization (hereafter industry specialists) 
provide higher quality audits (e.g., Craswell et al. 1995; Hogan and Jeter 1999; and Solomon et al. 1999). Industry 
specialists reduce the likelihood of earnings management (Kwon et al. 2007), mitigate the negative effects 
associated with short auditor tenure on earnings quality (Gul et al. 2009), increase the informativeness of earnings 
(Balsam et al. 2003) and increase the quality of client-firms’ disclosures (Dunn and Mayhew 2004). An 
experimental study also indicates that industry specialists are more competent in diagnosing financial misstatements 
(Hammersley 2006). Overall, research indicates that industry specialist auditors provide higher quality assurance 
and monitoring which we argue will also be positively reflected in M&A transactions of their clients.  
 
Research has examined the effect of audit firm size on various aspects of M&A transactions. Louis (2005) 
examines the role of external auditors of acquiring firms on stock prices around M&A announcements. He finds that 
acquirers audited by non-Big 4 (Big 4) accounting firms experience higher (lower) cumulative abnormal returns 
W 
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around M&A announcements. He argues that this is because non-Big 4 auditors have a superior knowledge of the 
local markets in which their clients make acquisitions and, therefore, are able to provide higher quality advisory 
services. However, since virtually all acquirers use Big 4 auditors, Louis’ sample only includes a small number of 
non-Big 4 auditors. More recently, Xie et al. (2013) document higher abnormal returns around M&A 
announcements involving acquired firms that are audited by Big N auditors.
1
 Their result is consistent with acquirer 
firms being provided with greater assurance when their targets are audited by the Big N. Golubov et al. (2011) also 
report that acquirers experience significantly higher M&A announcement returns when target firms are audited by 
Big N auditors. The authors state that financial information accuracy is higher when targets are audited by Big N, 
resulting in better matches of bidders-targets and higher synergies to acquiring firms. 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are complex transactions where conflicts of interests among various stakeholders 
are often severe and are accompanied by significant wealth transfers from acquirer shareholders to target 
shareholders along with significant increases in levels of information asymmetry between shareholders and 
managers (Agrawal et al. 1992; Loughran and Vijh 1997; Rau and Vermaelen 1998; Moeller et al. 2004; Erickson et 
al. 2012). M&A transactions also constitute one most complex areas of financial accounting that can create 
significant uncertainty about firms’ reported results for investors.  
 
Prior research suggests that industry specialists provide more monitoring (Dunn and Mayhew 2004) and 
higher quality services as business transactions increase in complexity (Balsam et al. 2003; Fleming and Romanus 
2007; GAO 2008). Consistent with this, using a sample of 4,283 M&A announcements between 1988 and 2011,
2
 we 
find that the stock market reaction is positive and larger when the acquiring firm is audited by an industry specialist 
after controlling for the effect of Big N auditors. Further, we find that the market response is more favorable when 
industry specialists are used in M&A deals that are complex and involve more information uncertainty. This study 
provides new evidence that industry specialist auditors play a significant role in M&A transactions.  
 
Mergers and acquisitions are highly significant events in the corporate finance world.
3
 M&A transactions 
can create synergies from economies of scale and secure greater market power for the acquirer.
4
 However, research 
has shown that there is tremendous variation in acquirers’ abnormal returns to M&A announcements.5 Further, 
“researchers have been unable to successfully explain much of this variation, partially because the announcement of 
a takeover reveals information about numerous things” about the transaction (Fuller et al. 2002, p. 1763). By 
examining the role of industry specialists in M&A deals, this study increases our understanding of the cross-
sectional variation in acquiring firms’ abnormal returns.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Corporate acquisitions generally represent the largest form of investment that companies undertake. While 
acquisitions have been studied in much detail, there is relatively little evidence on the role of external auditors in 
these transactions. The auditor is responsible for providing assurance on the combined financial statements including 
notes associated with the M&A transactions. As such, the auditor often performs an important role in the transaction 
as a part of the due-diligence process. The external auditor, for example, reviews the target’s accounting records, 
financial statements, internal controls and information systems. A typical review of the target’s financial statements 
includes ensuring that there are no accounting errors or irregularities and that there is conformity to GAAP. For 
consolidation and valuation purposes, the target’s financial statements are often restated in terms of the acquiring 
firm’s GAAP. The external auditor is also consulted on the tax aspects of the transaction. 
 
                                                 
1 It would be an interesting to see the effect of target auditors' industry expertise. However, most of our targets are private firms. In addition, our 
focus is on the acquirer side which makes our different unique compared to Xie et al. (2013) and all others which focus on target auditors or 
target accounting quality. 
2 Our sample period starts in 1988 because Compustat started providing the detailed non-Big N information in 1988.  
3 Deals are often worth billions of dollars, for example, the merger between SBC Communications Inc. and AT&T Corp. was worth $16 billion 
dollars. See CFO.com, Deals: The Return of Billion-Dollar M&A, February 26, 2008 for more examples. 
4 See Bradley et al. 1988; Seth 1990; Healy et al. 1992. Improved efficiency under new management can also be a source of value creation 
(Manne 1965; Dodd and Ruback 1977; Jensen and Ruback 1983). 
5 See Jensen and Ruback 1983; Singh and Montgomery 1987; Bradley et al. 1988; and Seth 1990.  
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There have been a few studies that have focused on the role of target auditors in M&A deals. For example, 
Xie et al. (2013) argue that Big N auditors of target firms provide higher quality assurance about the financial 
statements to acquirer firms than non-Big N auditors. Big N auditors of targets also provide greater “insurance” to 
acquirers in litigation because Big N auditors have deeper pockets. Using 2,130 completed acquisitions of public 
targets over 1987-2006, the authors find that targets with Big N auditors are more likely to become acquisition 
targets and ultimately get acquired. Using a five-day event window (-2, +2) for 1,909 completed acquisitions in 
1996-2008, Golubov et al. (2011) find that acquirers experience significantly positive abnormal returns when their 
targets are audited by Big 4 auditors. In both studies, however, the sample of target firms is limited to public firms 
which misses the majority of M&A transactions consisting of private target firms. Also, in both studies, only a small 
percentage of target firms are audited by non-Big N auditors. Xie et al. report that only 6.9 percent of their sample 
consists of target firms audited by non-Big N auditors, whereas in Golubov et al. this percentage is 9.59.  
 
Louis (2005) argues that mergers and acquisitions is one area where non-Big 4 auditors have a competitive 
advantage over Big 4 auditors. He suggests that non-Big 4 auditors of acquiring firms have superior knowledge of 
local markets because they have close and long-time connections with the local business communities and are able 
to provide more personalized services than Big 4 auditors. Using 3,707 M&A announcements between January 1980 
and December 2002, he finds, consistent with his theory, that acquirers audited by non-Big 4 accounting firms 
experience higher abnormal returns on the announcement of an acquisition. Virtually all acquiring firms, however, 
are audited by the Big 4 auditors; in Louis (2005) only 5.5 percent of the acquirers are audited by non-Big 4 
auditors.  
 
Prior research has found that, among the Big 4 auditors, those possessing industry specialization provide 
higher quality audits.  Jenkins et al. (2006) and Balsam et al. (2003) report that discretionary accruals are lower and 
earnings response coefficients are higher for firms audited by industry specialists. Hammersley (2006) reports that 
compared to other auditors, industry specialists are better able to find errors and accounting irregularities in financial 
statements of client-firms. Dunn and Mayhew (2005) document that industry specialists increase the quality of 
client-firms’ disclosures. Ahmed et al. (2008) find that the cost of debt and equity capital is lower for firms audited 
by industry specialists. Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) report that audit fees are higher for industry specialists, which 
is consistent with industry specialists providing higher quality audits.  
 
The role of industry specialist auditors in M&A transactions, however, has not been studied. Auditors of 
acquiring firms are responsible for evaluating measurements and assumptions underlying the combined financial 
statements in the year of acquisition and thereafter. Auditors must ensure that there are no GAAP violations or 
accounting irregularities associated with the acquisition. Xie et al. (2013) state that higher quality assurance 
provided by external auditors lowers financial information risks associated with M&A deals. Based on prior 
research showing that industry specialists provide higher quality assurance, we posit that industry specialists provide 
value to investors by more effectively reducing financial information risks. 
 
There is also greater monitoring and reduced information asymmetry present when the external auditor is 
an industry specialist (Godfrey and Hamilton 2005; Behn et al. 2008).
6
 Salavei and Moore (2005) suggest that 
financial restatements and SEC investigations often occur in post-merger periods due to accounting irregularities 
and improper accounting procedures during acquisitions. Louis (2005) states that a heightened level of scrutiny of 
the acquirer is inherent in the merger process because of additional disclosure requirements and an increased interest 
from investors about the acquisition. He also argues that when information asymmetry surrounding the acquirer firm 
is high, there are greater uncertainties for investors about the potential benefits of an acquisition. The use of industry 
specialists by acquirers could indicate that the acquiring firms are willing to be subjected to a higher level of 
monitoring (Balsam et al. 2003), which we posit will be viewed favorably by markets.  
 
  
                                                 
6Beatty (1989) and Willenborg(1999) also find that higher quality audits mitigate information asymmetry problems to a greater degree than lower 
quality audits. 
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Lastly, we argue that industry specialists are able to provide higher quality advisory services in an 
acquisition.7 This is because industry specialists have a greater understanding of their clients’ industry and business 
risks (Ahmed et al. 2008). We expect that during the due diligence process, industry specialists will be able to 
provide better advice to their acquirer-clients about the risks and outcomes of the proposed acquisition. Because 
M&A transactions involve a complicated analysis of a target’s business and industry risks and synergies to the 
acquirer, we expect that there will be a higher quality of service from an industry specialist. This is consistent with 
research showing that as business transactions become more complex, there is an elevation in the role of the industry 
specialist as advisor (Hogan and Jeter 1999; Solomon et al. 1999; Owhoso et al. 2002). Many acquisitions also 
involve targets belonging to the same industry as the acquirer which provides industry specialists a comparative 
advantage in the form of superior industry knowledge. 
 
We argue that for the reasons discussed, stock markets should react positively to M&A announcements 
when the acquirer’s auditor is an industry specialist.  Our hypothesis stated in an alternative form is below: 
 
H1: There is a positive association between auditors’ industry specialization and cumulative abnormal returns of 
acquirer firms around M&A announcements. 
 
RESEARCH MODELS 
 
Despite extensive research on abnormal returns of acquirers, much variation in the returns remains 
unexplained. Following Fuller et al. (2002) we compute cumulative abnormal returns using a five-day window (-2, 
+2) where event day 0 is the announcement date of the acquisition.
8
 Following Louis (2005) we use value-weighted 
returns and estimate the market model parameters over a 200-day period, specifically over event days, -210 to -11.  
 
To test our hypothesis, the model presented below is estimated: 
 
ACARit = 0 + 1BigNit + 2Audsp_TAit (or Audsp_dumit) + β3 B/Mit + β4ROAit+ β5 Log(Analyst)it 
+ β6 Log(Tgt_TA)it+ β7Stockit + β8Cash_Allit+ β9Poolit+ β10Privateit 
+ β11 NIB it + β12Inhouseit+ β13Indrelit + β14Friendlyit+ β15Rel_Sizeit 
+ β16Lambdait + year dummies          
 
Variable definitions are presented in Appendix. Lambda: the inverse Mills ratio from the Probit model of 
auditor choice.
9
 
 
Measuring Industry Specialization 
 
Prior studies argue that measures of industry specialization based on industry market shares of the auditing 
firms are better than other types of proxies (Balsam et al. 2003; Dunn and Mayhew 2004; Ahmed et al. 2008; among 
others). Therefore, we compute the industry market shares of external auditors across two-digit SIC industries and 
years as follows: 
 
                                                 
7 Louis (2005) assumes that there are no differences in the quality of M&A advisory services among the Big 4 audit firms. According to our 
definition of industry specialization indicator, there are only 6 observations of non-Big N specialist auditors in our sample. Our finding may 
therefore be primarily driven by the role of Big N specialist auditors. 
8 Fuller et al. (2002) find that M&A announcement dates in Security Data Corporation (SDC) are sometimes off by no more than two trading days 
from the actual announcement dates. For this reason, they argue that using a 5-day window around the announcement date better captures the 
announcement effect than 3-day window, without introducing substantial noise into the analysis. As a robustness check we use a 3-day window in 
our study and obtain qualitatively similar results. 
9 The auditor choice model we use is: BigNit= µ0 + µ1Ln(Acq_TA) it + µ2Acq_Leverage it + µ3Acq_Cashit 
+ µ4Ret_Vol it + µ5Acq_EP it + µ6Acq_Regind it + µ7SOX it + ɛ it, where Ln(Acq_TA)it is the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets (in 
million); Acq_Leverageit is the acquirer’s leverage defined as total liabilities divided by total assets; Acq_Cashit is the acquirer’s cash divided by 
total assets; Acq_EPit is the acquirer’s earnings-to-price ratio; Ret_Volit is a measure of the acquirer’s pre-merger stock volatility proxied by the 
standard deviation of the acquirer’s return over the period from 60 to 259 days before the merger announcement; Acq_Regindit is a binary variable 
taking the value one if the acquirer is in a regulated industry (SIC 60–69, and 49) and zero otherwise; and SOXit is a binary variable taking the 
value one if the announcement is made in 2003-2011and zero otherwise. 
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where, 
 
Audsp_TAik = industry market share of auditor i in industry k; 
i = an index of audit firms; 
j = an index of client firms; 
k = an index of client industries; 
n = number of audit firms in industry k; 
m = number of clients serviced by audit firm i in industry k; and 
Aijk = total client assets audited by auditor i of client j in industry k. 
 
Following the logic in Mayhew and Wilkins (2003), we define a proxy of industry specialization using 
equation (A) based on clients’ total assets (Audsp_TA).We also create an industry specialist indicator (Audsp_dum) 
where Audsp_dum equals one if Audsp_TA is greater than 20 percent during 1988-1997 (Big 6 regime), 25 percent 
during 1998-2000 (Big 5 regime), and 30 percent during 2001-2011 (Big 4 regime) and is zero otherwise.
10
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts positive and statistically significant coefficients on these proxies. 
 
Control Variables 
 
We control for a standard set of deal and acquirer characteristics used by Louis (2005), among others, that 
are related to acquirer returns. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) argue that acquirers with high book-to-market ratios 
(B/M) are less likely to be motivated by hubris in their acquisitions. Louis (2005) finds that acquiring firms with 
higher ROA experience lower announcement returns. We therefore include acquirer’s book-to-market ratios (B/M) 
and return on assets (ROA) as controls. We use the natural logarithm of analyst coverage (Log(Analyst)) as a proxy 
for information asymmetry surrounding the acquiring firm. As the level of information asymmetry increases, 
uncertainty about the acquisition increases which could decrease announcement day returns (Louis 2005). Chang 
(1998) also finds that M&A transactions involving higher levels of information asymmetry about the acquirer are 
associated with lower abnormal market returns. The natural logarithm of target firm size (Log(Tgt_TA)) is included 
as a control because small targets represent more manageable events  In support, Scanlon et al. (1989) and Louis 
(2004) find that acquirers’ abnormal returns decrease with the size of the targets.  
 
It is well known in M&A literature that acquirers experience significantly negative abnormal returns when 
they pay for their acquisitions with equity. For example, Travlos (1987) reports negative abnormal returns for firms 
financing a takeover with common stock and no abnormal returns for those financing with cash. The negative 
market reaction in stock-for-stock acquisitions is generally attributed to the adverse selection problem in equity 
issuance (Myers and Majluf 1984; Travlos 1987; Louis 2005). Thus, we include the percentage of the transaction 
financed with common stock (Stock) and also a binary variable (Cash_All)-- the latter to control for discontinuities 
around zero in this variable. 
 
An indicator variable representing the pooling-of-interest method (Pool) is included because of research 
showing that M&A transactions accounted under the pooling method are motivated by accounting rather than value 
considerations (Lys and Vincent 1995; Pandit 2006). An indicator variable denoting that the target is a private 
company (Private) is included because of Chang (1998) and Fuller et al. (2002) who find a positive market reaction 
to announcements of acquisitions of privately owned firms. Their interpretation is that acquirers capture a liquidity 
discount when buying private targets. The number of investment banking firms involved in the M&A transaction 
(NIB) is included because of Servaes and Zenner (1996) who find that acquirers using the services of investment 
bankers experience lower acquisition announcement returns. In addition, an indicator variable denoting that no 
investment bankers were used (Inhouse) is included to control for discontinuities around zero.  
                                                 
10 Using Audsp_dum defined on the single threshold over the entire sample period may bias the results due to the increasing concentration of the 
audit industry. Following Kwon et al. (2007) we thus use the 20 percent market share threshold during 1988-1997 (Big 6 regime), 25 percent 
during 1998-2000 (Big 5 regime), and 30 percent during 2001-2011 (Big 4 regime) to construct Audsp_dum. Results are robust to using 20, 25 or 
30 percent for all sample years. 
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An indicator representing industry relatedness of the merging firms (Indrel) is included because of Morck 
et al. (1990) who show that acquirers experience lower abnormal returns for diversifying (i.e., acquisitions in 
different industries) than vertical acquisitions. An indicator representing whether the target’s attitude to a proposed 
merger is friendly (Friendly) is included because friendly acquisitions are less costly to acquirers (Schwert 2000). 
We control for relative size (Rel_Size) motivated by studies by Asquith et al. (1983) and Moeller et al. (2005) who 
find that bidder announcement returns increase as relative deal size increases. Following Louis (2005) we calculate 
the inverse Mills ratio (Lambda) and include it in two models in Table 4 in order to control for any possible 
endogeneity associated with choice of a Big N auditor.
11
 The definitions of the variables used in our tests are 
summarized in Appendix. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Sample Selection 
 
Our sample covers announcements of mergers and acquisitions between January 1988 and December 2011. 
The sample was drawn from Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) database of U.S. mergers and acquisitions. The 
sample consists of acquisitions of at least 50 percent of the outstanding shares of target firms.
12
 The M&A 
transactions in our sample also satisfied the following criteria: (a) the acquirer was a publicly traded company; (b) 
the method of payment was reported on SDC; (c) the target’s total assets were reported on SDC or Compustat; (d) 
the acquirer’s financial statement data on book value, number of shares outstanding, net income, total assets, total 
liabilities, and auditor code, was available on COMPUSTAT; and (e) the acquirer had the necessary data available 
on CRSP to compute abnormal return and it also had analyst data on I/B/E/S.  There are 4,283 M&A transactions 
that met all our selection criteria. Of these, 1,223 (29 percent) acquirer-firms were audited by industry specialist 
auditors (defined using the proxy Audsp_dum). 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of our sample acquisitions by announcement year. Beginning in 1991, 
the number of acquisitions in each year generally increases annually until it reaches its highest level in 1997. Then it 
drops off significantly in 2002 before rebounding in subsequent years. Table 1 also shows that there is no clustering 
of the sample in any given year.  
 
                                                 
11 One may argue that the selection of an industry specialist auditor is not a random choice by the client and thus the determinants of this choice 
need to be controlled for in the estimation where a dummy industry specialization variable is used. In a reduced sample where only Big N 
acquirers are included we control for an endogeneity effect of the choice of industry specialists (Indsp_dum) using the following selection model. 
Indsp_dumit = µ0 + µ1Ln(Acq_TA) it + µ2Acq_Leverage it + µ3Acq_Cashit + µ4Ret_Vol it + µ5Acq_EP it + µ6Acq_Regind it + µ7SOX it + ɛ it. Results 
show that the effect of industry specialists remains to be significant even after we control for this endogeneity effect. 
12 When we only include M&A transactions involving acquisitions of 100 percent of the controlling shares of the target company, the sample size 
is reduced from 4,283 to 3,827. The effect of industry specialists remains to be significant in this reduced sample. 
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Table 1. Sample Distribution 
Announcement 
Year 
Total 
Non-
specialists 
Specialists 
Percent of 
specialists 
Big N firms Non-Big N firms 
Total 
Non-
specialists 
Specialists Total 
Non-
specialists 
Specialists 
1988 57 41 16 28% 54 39 15 3 2 1 
1989 69 51 18 26% 67 49 18 2 2 0 
1990 50 35 15 30% 47 32 15 3 3 0 
1991 66 50 16 24% 64 48 16 2 2 0 
1992 151 101 50 33% 136 86 50 15 15 0 
1993 210 145 65 31% 191 127 64 19 18 1 
1994 232 172 60 26% 212 152 60 20 20 0 
1995 165 127 38 23% 157 120 37 8 7 1 
1996 139 95 44 32% 134 90 44 5 5 0 
1997 326 242 84 26% 298 215 83 28 27 1 
1998 293 236 57 19% 276 221 55 17 15 2 
1999 264 192 72 27% 253 181 72 11 11 0 
2000 223 151 72 32% 215 143 72 8 8 0 
2001 156 111 45 29% 149 104 45 7 7 0 
2002 105 73 32 30% 100 68 32 5 5 0 
2003 130 91 39 30% 121 82 39 9 9 0 
2004 100 71 29 29% 91 62 29 9 9 0 
2005 115 94 21 18% 103 82 21 12 12 0 
2006 204 157 47 23% 171 124 47 33 33 0 
2007 323 235 88 27% 291 203 88 32 32 0 
2008 278 171 107 38% 246 139 107 32 32 0 
2009 217 150 67 31% 197 130 67 20 20 0 
2010 224 143 81 36% 206 125 81 18 18 0 
2011 186 126 60 32% 167 107 60 19 19 0 
 
4,283 3,060 1,223 29% 3,946 2,729 1,217 337 331 6 
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Table 2, Panel A presents the summary statistics for the sample according to industry specialization.
13
 
About 99.5 percent of specialists and 89.2 percent of non-specialists are Big N auditors. The mean (median) value of 
auditor market share (Audsp_TA) is about 19.0 percent. For firms possessing higher growth opportunities (lower 
B/M) and more profitable prospects (higher ROA) a higher quality auditor is used which is consistent with Kwon et 
al. (2007). Information asymmetry proxied by Log(Analysts) is significantly lower for firms audited by industry 
specialists (Dunn and Mayhew 2004). We also find that firms with specialist auditors acquire larger targets 
(Log(Tgt_TA)), and are relatively larger in size (Rel_Size). Acquirers with specialist auditors, on average, have a 
lower percentage of the transaction financed using equity (Stock) and are more likely to finance the transaction 
entirely using cash (i.e., Cash_All=1). Since equity financing generally indicates an overvaluation of acquiring firm 
this result indicates that acquirers with specialist auditors face a smaller adverse selection problem (Myers and 
Majluf 1984). Alternatively, firms audited by industry specialists are more easily able to obtain financing from 
banks for the acquisition (Ahmed et al. 2008). Acquirers with specialist auditors use the pooling-of-interest method 
(i.e., Pool=1) less often than the purchase method (Lys and Vincent 1995; Pandit 2006). Firms using specialist 
auditors have more acquisitions of public companies (i.e., Private=0) possibly because public companies are more 
complex and require higher quality audits (Abbott 2006). Firms with industry specialist auditors are more likely to 
use the services of an investment banker (i.e., Inhouse=0) and hire more investment bankers (NIB) which is 
consistent with the idea that investment bankers pressure acquirers to hire higher quality auditors (Balvers et al. 
1988). Firms with industry specialist auditors have fewer acquisitions of targets in the same industry (i.e., Indrel=1). 
A possible reason is that clients of specialist auditors have the largest market share in the industry and therefore 
making additional acquisitions may be more difficult due to anti-trust regulations.
14
 Mean and median values of all 
variables are significantly different at least at the 10-percent level of testing across industry specialist and non-
specialist groups. 
 
The Pearson correlation matrix in Table 2, Panel B shows that there is a significant positive correlation 
between the acquirers’ abnormal returns (ACAR) and acquisitions by clients of industry specialists. Consistent with 
Louis (2005) abnormal return is negatively correlated with the audit firm size (BigN). The abnormal return is 
positively correlated with the acquirers’ book-to-market ratios (B/M), private acquisitions (Private),  and the 
likelihood that the acquirers use in-house advisers (Inhouse), and negatively correlated with the targets’ sizes 
(Log(Tgt_TA)), the acquirers’ ROA (ROA), analyst coverage (Log(Analyst)), stock-for-stock acquisitions (Stock), 
and pooling-of-interest acquisitions (Pool). With the exception of Indrel, Friendly, and Rel_Size, the other variables 
are also statistically significantly correlated with ACAR. Among control variables, the highest correlations are 
between NIB and Inhouse (ρ=-0.731) and between Log(Tgt_TA) and NIB (ρ=0.616).15 Acquisitions by clients of 
industry specialists are positively correlated with profitability (ROA), analyst coverage (Log(Analyst)), total assets 
(Log(Tgt_TA)), financing the transaction entirely using cash (Cash_All), number of investment banks (NIB) and 
relative size (Rel_Size), and negatively correlated with private acquisitions (Private), the likelihood that the 
acquirers use in-house advisers (Inhouse), pooling-of-interest acquisitions (Pool), and friendly acquisitions 
(Frinedly). These correlations are generally consistent with expectations. 
 
                                                 
13 We winsorize all continuous variables at both extreme 1 percentiles each year to make sure our results are not driven by outliers. 
14 There is a strong positive correlation between NIB and INDREL. This means the effect of industry specialists may be mitigated by hiring of 
investment banks as M&A advisors. Therefore, specialists are found more often in diversified M&As than focused ones. Another explanation will 
be that by definition clients of specialists have the largest market shares. Thus, it will be more difficult to make industry related acquisitions due 
to anti-monopoly regulations although specialists may provide higher quality service in industry related acquisitions. 
15 To alleviate concerns about multicollinearity in our regressions, we examine the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for these variables. None of 
the variables have VIFs greater than five. Also, dropping one or both of the most highly correlated variables does not change our conclusions. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics And Pearson Correlations 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 
(1) 
Full Sample 
(N=4,283) 
(2) 
Specialists 
(N=1,223) 
(3) 
Non-specialists 
(N=3,060) 
(2)-(3) 
 
Mean STD p25 Median p75 Mean Med Mean Med Mean Median 
ACAR 0.426 8.529 -3.653 0.105 4.035 0.828 0.465 0.265 0.020 0.563*** 0.446** 
BigN 0.921 0.269 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.995 1.000 0.892 1.000 0.103*** 0.000*** 
Audsp_TA 0.190 0.111 0.112 0.188 0.253 0.304 0.284 0.145 0.151 0.159*** 0.133** 
B/M 0.473 0.399 0.228 0.393 0.617 0.469 0.383 0.475 0.397 -0.006*** -0.014*** 
ROA 0.020 0.179 0.010 0.047 0.087 0.028 0.053 0.016 0.045 0.012*** 0.008*** 
Log(Analyst) 1.542 1.019 0.693 1.609 2.398 1.680 1.792 1.487 1.386 0.194*** 0.405*** 
Log(Tgt_TA) 4.264 2.392 2.565 4.171 5.822 4.487 4.407 4.175 4.093 0.312*** 0.315*** 
Stock 33.285 42.611 0.000 0.000 80.670 29.376 0.000 34.847 0.000 -5.470*** -0.000*** 
Cash_All 0.302 0.459 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.334 0.000 0.289 0.000 0.046*** 0.000*** 
Pool 0.099 0.298 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.105 0.000 -0.023*** -0.000*** 
Private 0.441 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.422 0.000 0.449 0.000 -0.027** -0.000* 
NIB 1.433 1.279 0.000 1.000 2.000 1.513 1.000 1.400 1.000 0.113*** 0.000*** 
Inhouse 0.477 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.459 0.000 0.485 0.000 -0.026** -0.000* 
Indrel 0.499 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.464 0.000 0.513 1.000 -0.049*** -1.000*** 
Friendly 0.967 0.180 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.958 1.000 0.970 1.000 -0.012** -0.000** 
Rel_Size 114.194 549.984 3.259 9.219 33.316 122.622 10.394 110.825 8.770 11.797*** 1.624*** 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on one-tailed tests.  
Variable definitions are in Appendix. 
 
 
  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2015 Volume 31, Number 4 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1254 The Clute Institute 
(Table 2 continued) 
Panel B. Pearson correlation 
 
ACAR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) BigN -0.061 
               
 
(<0.01) 
               (2) Audsp_TA 0.031 0.169 
              
 
(0.05) (<0.01) 
              (3) Audsp_dum 0.030 0.173 0.650 
             
 
(0.05) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
             (4) B/M 0.028 -0.052 -0.006 -0.007 
            
 
(0.07) (<0.01) (0.72) (0.64) 
            (5) ROA -0.061 0.080 0.047 0.030 -0.077 
           
 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.05) (<0.01) 
           (6) Log(Analyst) -0.099 0.183 0.119 0.086 -0.220 0.223 
          
 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
          (7) Log(Tgt_TA) -0.115 0.176 0.155 0.059 0.073 0.168 0.283 
         
 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
         (8) Stock -0.128 0.012 -0.060 -0.058 -0.083 -0.133 0.053 0.041 
        
 
(<0.01) (0.44) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
        (9) Cash_All 0.027 0.068 0.082 0.045 -0.005 0.122 0.160 0.092 -0.514 
       
 
(0.07) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.72) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
       (10) Pool -0.058 0.056 -0.061 -0.036 -0.145 0.056 0.111 -0.007 0.481 -0.216 
      
 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.02) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.66) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
      (11) Private 0.186 -0.142 -0.112 -0.024 -0.006 -0.106 -0.235 -0.536 -0.148 -0.165 -0.074 
     
 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.11) (0.69) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
     (12) NIB -0.147 0.144 0.123 0.040 -0.028 0.082 0.297 0.616 0.160 0.054 0.063 -0.470 
    
 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.07) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
    (13) Inhouse 0.129 -0.123 -0.092 -0.024 0.035 -0.048 -0.251 -0.489 -0.195 -0.021 -0.117 0.370 -0.731 
   
 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.12) (0.02) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.17) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
   (14) Indrel -0.014 0.021 -0.007 -0.045 -0.026 -0.005 0.054 0.046 0.106 -0.061 0.035 -0.061 0.082 -0.061 
  
 
(0.36) (0.17) (0.66) (<0.01) (0.09) (0.75) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.02) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
  (15) Friendly 0.017 -0.021 -0.052 -0.029 -0.048 -0.010 0.022 -0.193 0.058 -0.059 0.053 0.134 -0.136 0.081 -0.028 
 
 
(0.27) (0.18) (<0.01) (0.06) (<0.01) (0.51) (0.14) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.07) 
 (16) Rel_Size 0.001 0.024 0.049 0.010 -0.008 0.030 0.026 -0.151 -0.068 0.063 -0.042 -0.045 -0.068 0.087 -0.064 0.003 
 
(0.97) (0.12) (<0.01) (0.53) (0.58) (0.05) (0.08) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.85) 
The sample consists of 4,283 U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1988 and 2011 made by firms. P-values are shown in parentheses. Variable definitions are in 
the Appendix. 
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Acquirers’ Abnormal Returns 
 
Table 3 shows that, on average, acquirers experience a positive market reaction to M&A announcements. 
Note that our sample contains both public and private targets. Extant literature documents significantly positive 
returns in acquisitions of private targets and zero or negative returns in acquisitions of public targets. Our results are 
consistent with Masulis et al. (2007) and Fuller et al. (2002) who report positive returns on a combined sample of 
public and private targets. As expected, the market reaction is significantly greater for acquiring firms audited by 
industry specialists than acquiring firms audited by non-specialists. To remove the potential effect of audit firm size 
on the abnormal returns documented by Louis (2005) we compare abnormal returns after removing all non-Big N 
firms from the sample. The difference in the abnormal returns between industry specialists and non-specialists 
becomes even greater for the Big N only sample.    
 
We next partition the data into several groups based on industry relatedness, target ownership status, deal 
payment method, the existence of investment banker, and analyst coverage. First, we condition our analysis on 
industry relatedness (Indrel). We find that acquirers with specialist auditors experience higher abnormal returns 
(significant at least at the five percent level) when the targets are in the same industry (i.e., Indrel=1). On the other 
hand, the differences in the mean and median abnormal returns for specialists’ clients and non-specialists’ clients are 
not significantly different from zero in the cross-industry acquisitions. This is consistent with our conjecture that 
industry specialists have a comparative advantage in providing M&A advisory service and assurance of combined 
firms’ financial statements using superior industry specific knowledge. 
 
Table 3 also shows that industry specialists provide higher quality services when deals are complex. 
Specifically, the effect of specialists is greater when the target is a public company and uses more equity financing 
as a source of funding. Acquirers experience negative abnormal returns when their targets are public firms (i.e., 
Private=0). However, acquirers with specialist auditors experience significantly less negative returns indicating the 
effect of industry specialists is more pronounced in the acquisition of public targets. Acquirers of private targets on 
the other hand, experience positive abnormal returns; but, there is no statistical difference in the abnormal returns for 
the specialist and non-specialist groups. Acquirers with industry specialist auditors experience higher abnormal 
returns, when the proportion of stock financing (Stock) is greater.  
 
Acquirers with industry specialist auditors experience lower negative abnormal returns, when the services 
of investment banks are used (i.e., Inhouse=0).
16
 Acquirers with industry specialist auditors experience higher 
abnormal returns when no investment bankers are identified in SDC suggesting that industry specialist auditors play 
a greater significant role when investment bankers are not present. Lastly, acquirers audited by industry specialists 
experience significantly higher abnormal returns when information asymmetry surrounding acquirers is large (i.e., 
low analyst coverage, Log(Analyst)<Median). Acquirers audited by industry specialists also experience significantly 
lower negative abnormal returns when information asymmetry is small. 
 
These univariate comparisons generally support our predictions that industry specialists provide higher 
quality services when deals are complex (e.g., when the target is a public company and uses more equity financing 
as a source of funding), when the target is in the same industry, when investment bankers are not used, and there is 
greater uncertainty surrounding the acquisition. In sum, results in Table 3 show that clients of industry specialists are 
more likely to outperform clients of non-specialists when the likelihood of the industry specialist auditors playing a 
prominent role increases. In section 4.4, we provide more detailed tests using multivariate regressions. 
 
  
                                                 
16 This result is consistent with the idea that industry specialists play more significant assurance, monitoring, and advisory roles when investment 
banks are not used. Alternatively, when investment banks are used, industry specialists deliver greater value to acquirers reducing negative 
returns. Investment banks are known to pressure clients to hire high quality auditors so that they have greater assurance that due diligence 
procedures have been complied with. 
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Table 3. Univariate Analysis: Acquirers’ Percentage Cumulative Abnormal Return  
Around The Merger Announcement: Clients Of Industry Specialist Audit Firms Versus Clients Of Non-Specialist Audit Firms 
 
(1) 
Full sample 
(2) 
Specialists 
(3) 
Non-specialists 
(2)-(3) 
 
 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median 
Full sample 4283 0.426 0.105 1223 0.828 0.465 3060 0.265 0.020 0.563*** 0.446** 
Big4 Only 3946 0.273 0.024 1217 0.783 0.400 2729 0.046 -0.182 0.737*** 0.581*** 
Within Industry M&As 2137 0.305 0.201 567 0.949 0.567 1570 0.072 -0.024 0.877*** 0.591** 
Cross Industry M&As 2146 0.546 0.065 656 0.723 0.380 1490 0.468 0.023 0.255 0.357 
Public Target 2394 -0.986 -0.744 707 -0.312 -0.027 1687 -1.269 -0.954 0.957*** 0.927*** 
Private Target 1889 2.215 1.483 516 2.390 1.174 1373 2.150 1.531 0.241 -0.357 
Stock M&As 2990 0.272 -0.018 814 0.814 0.250 2176 0.070 -0.158 0.744** 0.408* 
Cash Only M&As 1293 0.781 0.428 409 0.857 0.749 884 0.745 0.280 0.111 0.469 
Investment Banker 2238 -0.628 -0.625 662 -0.380 -0.249 1576 -0.733 -0.766 0.352* 0.517 
No Investment Banker 2045 1.580 0.744 561 2.254 1.109 1484 1.325 0.549 0.929*** 0.560*** 
Low Analyst Coverage 2301 1.187 0.558 583 1.970 1.076 1718 0.921 0.390 1.048* 0.686* 
High Analyst Coverage 1982 -0.458 -0.318 640 -0.212 -0.077 1342 -0.575 -0.536 0.363*** 0.459*** 
Column (1) reports full sample mean and median, and column (2) and (3) report the mean and median acquirers’ percentage 
cumulative abnormal return around the merger announcement: full sample, clients of industry specialist audit firms, and clients of 
non-specialist audit firms, respectively. The last column reports the mean and median differences between clients of industry 
specialist audit firms and clients of non-specialist audit firms. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on one-tailed tests.  
 
Regression Analyses of Industry Specialization on the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
In Table 4, we report the results from our main regressions, controlling for all the bidder traits and deal 
characteristics. For brevity, intercepts and year dummies are not reported in Table 4. First, we replicate the main 
regression of Louis (2005) in regression (1) before we examine incremental effect of audit firm specialization. The 
coefficient estimate of BigN is -0.987 with a t-value of -1.70, consistent with results documented in Louis (2005). 
Next we measure the effect of audit firm industry specialization in a reduced sample of 3,946 acquisitions after 
removing all non-Big N auditors. Consistent with our prediction the coefficient estimate of Audsp_TA is 
significantly positive with a t-value of 2.40 indicating that industry specialist auditors increase acquirer shareholder 
value.  
 
Regression (3) and regression (6) are the main regressions that include industry specialization (Audsp_TA 
or Audsp_dum) as well as BigN. In both regressions, BigN continues to be negative and significant. In addition, we 
find that both Audsp_TA and Audsp_dum have significantly positive coefficients after controlling for BigN and 
bidder and deal characteristics. The coefficients suggest that increases to shareholder value are also economically 
significant. For example, the coefficient estimate of Audsp_dum in regression (6) is 0.772 with a t-statistic of 2.68, 
indicating that industry specialist auditors increase bidder shareholder value by about 0.772 percent which is a 
nontrivial number relative to the average acquisition announcement effect or ACAR of 0.426 percent.  
 
In regression (4) and regression (7) we re-estimate the model after considering BigN auditor endogeneity. 
Specifically, we use Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure to ensure that announcement period return to the size of 
the audit firm is not driven by the determinants related to auditor choice. We add Lamda, the Inverse Mills Ratio 
from the Probit model below, to regression (4) and regression (7). 
 
BigNit  = µ0 + µ1Ln(Acq_TA) it + µ2Acq_Leverage it + µ3Acq_Cashit+ µ4Ret_Vol it  
+ µ5Acq_EP it + µ6Acq_Regind it + µ7SOX it + ɛ it. 
 
Variable definitions are presented in Appendix. 
 
In both estimation models, our variables for industry specialization remain to be significant. To alleviate 
this problem of cross-correlation in residuals, we add year fixed effect to all the regressions and use standard errors 
adjusted for firm-clustering. We also report as an additional robustness check, results using the Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) method. Specifically, we first run cross-sectional regressions for each year. Then, we report the time series 
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averages of the coefficient estimates, and use the time-series standard errors of the average slope coefficients to 
draw inferences. The coefficient estimates and t-statistics from Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions reported in 
regression (5) corroborate our findings using the pooled OLS regressions.
17
  
 
With regard to our control variables, both the magnitude and statistical significance of the parameter 
estimates are fairly stable across the model specifications in Table 4. Most of the estimates for the control variables 
are consistent with the findings of Louis (2005). Specifically, we observe that ROA has a significantly negative 
effect on acquirer returns. Stock is negatively and statistically significantly associated with ACAR supporting the 
idea that stock transactions signal to markets that bidding firms are in the possession of adverse private information. 
Cash_All is significant at the 10 percent level, which is also supportive of the above explanation. The coefficient on 
Private is positive and significant at the one percent level confirming that acquisitions of private firms elicit a more 
favorable market response. The coefficients of NIB is negative and statistically significant. Similarly, acquirer 
returns are higher, although insignificantly, for acquisitions with no investment banker (Inhouse). Log(Tgt_TA) is 
significant at the 5 percent level, but inconsistent with the expected direction. Inconsistent with our expectation, the 
coefficients on Log(Analyst) are negative although they are only marginally significant. An explanation is that 
analyst following is highly correlated with acquirer size which is negatively associated with abnormal returns. 
Finally, the coefficients on B/M, Pool, Inhouse, Indrel, Friendly, and Rel_Size are statistically insignificant. 
 
In summary, the main results of interest namely, the coefficients on the industry specialization measures, 
are as predicted positive and statistically significant in all six models at least at the five percent level of testing. The 
results support the idea that industry specialists increase shareholder value of acquiring firms by providing higher 
quality assurance, monitoring, and possibly advisory services to their clients in M&A transactions. 
 
Additional Analyses 
 
When is the Industry Specialization Effect Stronger? 
 
The use of specialist-auditors involves higher costs to acquiring firms. As previously argued, however, we 
predict that benefits to the acquiring firm will likely exceed costs where the deals are complex, the amount of 
information asymmetry surrounding the acquirer is high, the target is in the same industry, and when investment 
bankers are not used. The univariate evidence in Table 3 generally supports our prediction. We additionally estimate 
the following multivariate regression model which includes five two-way interaction variables and a three-way 
interaction variable (i.e., Audsp×Stock, Audsp×Inhouse, Audsp×Private, Audsp×Log(Analyst), Audsp×Indrel, and 
Audsp×Inhousel×Stock). 
 
ACARit  = β0 + β1BigN it+ β2Audspit+ β2-1Audspit×Stockit+ β2-2Audspit×Inhouseit 
+ β2-3Audspit×Inhouseit×Stockit+ β2-4Audspit×Privateit 
+ β2-5Audspit×Indrelit+β2-6Audspit×Log(Analyst)it 
+ β3 B/Mit+ β4ROAit+ β5Log(Analyst)+ β6Log(Tgt_TA)it+ β7Stockit 
+ β8Cash_Allit+ β9Poolit+ β10Privateit +β11NIBit+ β12Inhouseit  
+ β13Indrelit+β14Friendlyit+ β15Rel_Sizeit+ year dummy +it,              
 
Variable definitions are presented in Appendix. Audspit is either Audsp_TAit or Audsp_dumit. 
 
Audsp×Stock is expected to be positively related to abnormal returns because industry specialists can 
reduce information asymmetry where stock is used to finance a deal. The coefficient on Audsp_TA×Inhouse is 
expected to be positive because industry specialists are expected to play a more significant role advising acquirers 
when investment bankers are not present. The coefficient on Audsp×Private is expected to be negative because we 
expect higher quality assurance, monitoring and advisory services from specialist auditors in acquisitions of public 
targets, which are more complex transactions. The coefficient on Audsp×Indrel is predicted to be positive because 
                                                 
17 Note that the Fama-MacBeth methodology is a conservative way of accounting for potential cross-correlation in residuals. According to Fama 
and French (2002), Fama-MacBeth standard errors are often two to five times the OLS standard errors from pooled panel regressions that ignore 
cross-correlation.  
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we expect a favorable market response to the use of industry specialist auditors in acquisitions of targets from a 
related industry. Audsp_TA×Log(Analyst) is expected to be negatively related to abnormal returns because the role 
of industry specialist auditors is expected to be more pronounced when there is greater information asymmetry 
surrounding the acquiring firm. Motivated by Louis (2005), we include a three-way interaction. 
Audsp×Inhouse×Stock is expected to be positive if industry specialist auditors play a more important role where 
investment bankers are not present and the deals are financed with a greater proportion of stock.  
 
Table 5 summarizes the regression results. Consistent with the main results, our industry specialization 
measures (Audsp_TA and Audsp_dum) remain positive and significant even with the inclusion of the interaction 
variables. As expected, the coefficient on Audsp×Private is positive and statistically significant at least at the five 
percent level. Also the coefficient on Audsp_TA×Log(Analyst) is negative in the regression with Audsp_TA, but it is 
insignificant in the regression with Audsp_dum. The coefficient on Audsp×Stock is insignificant while that on 
Audsp×Inhouse×Stock is significantly positive. The coefficient on Audsp×Inhouse is insignificant indicating that the 
effect of industry specialist auditors is not pronounced in acquisitions financed by cash only.  
 
The significantly positive coefficient on  Audsp×Inhouse×Stock suggests that for all deals financed by 
equity either partially or fully industry specialists play a more significant role advising acquirers when investment 
bankers are not present. We find that the coefficient on Audsp×Indrel is not significant after controlling for other 
interaction effects, which suggests that the effect of industry specialists is not different between inter-industry and 
intra-industry M&As. A possible reason is that there is relatively less information asymmetry in acquisitions 
between the firms in the same industry. The above results are hold, regardless of whether we control for BigN or not. 
We perform the same estimation on a reduced sample with only BigN acquirers and find (Untabulated) qualitatively 
similar results.  
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Table 4. Baseline Regression Models 
 
Dependent Variable = ACAR 
 
Audsp_TA Audsp_dum 
 (1) Louis (2005) 
Model 
(2) BigN Only 
Sample 
(3) Baseline 
Model- 
Continuous 
Variable 
(4) Heckmann 
Model 
(5) Fama-
Macbeth 
Model 
(6) Dummy 
Variable 
(7) Heckmann 
Model 
 
BigN -0.987**  -1.555*** -1.598*** -0.988 -1.202** -1.247** 
 (-1.70)  (-2.52) (-2.55) (-1.17) (-2.05) (-2.08) 
Audsp_TA 
 
3.316*** 3.595*** 3.598*** 2.771** 
   (2.40) (2.67) (2.67) (2.31) 
Audsp_dum      0.772*** 0.773*** 
      (2.68) (2.68) 
B/M 0.205 -0.111 0.213 0.214 0.090 0.208 0.209 
 (0.43) (-0.23) (0.44) (0.44) (0.18) (0.43) (0.43) 
ROA -2.863*** -2.604** -2.865*** -2.888*** -2.038 -2.850** -2.875*** 
 (-2.41) (-2.07) (-2.42) (-2.41) (-1.23) (-2.41) (-2.40) 
Log(Analyst) -0.176 -0.279** -0.182* -0.194* -0.310** -0.202* -0.214* 
 (-1.26) (-1.96) (-1.30) (-1.36) (-1.75) (-1.44) (-1.51) 
Log(Tgt_TA) 0.151** 0.121* 0.150** 0.141* 0.107 0.149** 0.140* 
 (1.86) (1.48) (1.85) (1.57) (0.99) (1.84) (1.56) 
Stock -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (-4.27) (-3.77) (-4.21) (-4.18) (-3.56) (-4.19) (-4.16) 
Cash_All 0.447* 0.582** 0.465* 0.458* 0.809 0.459* 0.451* 
 (1.42) (1.83) (1.48) (1.44) (0.69) (1.46) (1.42) 
Pool -0.095 -0.313 -0.078 -0.087 -0.595 -0.079 -0.088 
 (-0.17) (-0.54) (-0.14) (-0.15) (-0.79) (-0.14) (-0.15) 
Private 2.191*** 2.091*** 2.181*** 2.195*** 1.563*** 2.177*** 2.192*** 
 (6.46) (5.97) (6.42) (6.32) (5.42) (6.41) (6.31) 
NIB -0.320** -0.332** -0.326** -0.327** -0.335 -0.323** -0.324** 
 (-2.14) (-2.17) (-2.18) (-2.18) (-1.20) (-2.15) (-2.16) 
Inhouse 0.382 0.334 0.385 0.383 0.440 0.379 0.377 
 (1.03) (0.87) (1.04) (1.03) (0.79) (1.02) (1.01) 
Indrel 0.263 0.355* 0.287 0.286 0.545* 0.299 0.297 
 (1.05) (1.38) (1.15) (1.14) (1.46) (1.19) (1.19) 
Friendly -0.178 0.172 -0.168 -0.172 -0.184 -0.161 -0.166 
 (-0.37) (0.35) (-0.35) (-0.36) (-0.26) (-0.33) (-0.34) 
Rel_Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.92) (0.47) (0.86) (0.70) (-0.89) (0.95) (0.78) 
Lambda    -0.299   -0.318 
    (-0.21)   (-0.22) 
Year Fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 4,283 3,946 4,283 4,283 4,283 4,283 4,283 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.068 0.068 0.069 0.069 0.040 0.069 0.069 
Notes:  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level in a one-tail test, respectively. T-values are based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering (Petersen 2009). Variable definitions are presented in Appendix 
2.Variable definitions are in Appendix. 
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Table 5. When Is Industry Specialist Effect Stronger? 
 Dependent Variable = ACAR 
 
Audsp=Audsp_TA Audsp=Audsp_dum 
BigN -1.684*** -1.233** 
 
(-2.75) (-2.12) 
Audsp 10.275*** 1.449** 
 (2.78) (1.79) 
Audsp ×Stock -0.032 -0.009 
 (-0.96) (-1.08) 
Audsp×Inhouse  -2.439 -0.157 
 (-0.90) (-0.24) 
Audsp×Inhouse×Stock 0.126*** 0.043*** 
 (3.96) (3.27) 
Audsp×Private -4.922** -1.225** 
 (-1.80) (-2.01) 
Audsp×Indrel 0.982 0.572 
 (0.43) (1.04) 
Audsp× Log(Analyst) -2.692** -0.308 
 (-2.19) (-1.11) 
B/M 0.257 0.200 
 (0.53) (0.42) 
ROA -2.893*** -2.874*** 
 (-2.40) (-2.41) 
Log(Analyst) 0.356 -0.117 
 (1.20) (-0.71) 
Log(Tgt_TA) 0.154** 0.155** 
 (1.91) (1.91) 
Stock -0.023*** -0.022*** 
 (-3.06) (-4.42) 
Cash_All 0.313 0.355 
 (1.00) (1.13) 
Pool 0.109 0.084 
 (0.19) (0.15) 
Private 3.066*** 2.466*** 
 (4.97) (6.35) 
NIB -0.335** -0.328** 
 (-2.24) (-2.19) 
Inhouse 0.171 0.117 
 (0.27) (0.28) 
Indrel 0.109 0.148 
 (0.21) (0.49) 
Friendly 0.011 -0.034 
 (0.02) (-0.07) 
Rel_Size 0.000 0.000 
 (0.97) (0.96) 
Year Fixed effect Yes Yes 
Observations 4,283 4,283 
Adj. R-squared 0.075 0.074 
Notes:  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level in a one-tail test, respectively. T-values are based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering (Petersen 2009). Variable definitions are presented in Appendix. 
 
Alternative Measures of Audit firm Industry Specialization 
 
In this section, we perform sensitivity tests for four alternative measures of audit firm industry 
specialization. Following the industry specialization literature we use the following measures of audit firm 
specialization: Audsp_Sale, Audsp_Client, Leader, and Dominance. Audsp_Sale is the market share of the auditor 
measured in client sales in a two-digit industry (Balsam et al. 2003). Audsp_Client is defined as the market share of 
the auditor measured in the number of clients in a two-digit industry (Balsam et al. 2003). Leader is a binary 
variable that is equal to 1 for industry specialists, 0 otherwise where industry specialists are identified as the largest 
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auditor in each industry, as well as the second- and third-largest auditors in industries (Balsam et al. 2003). 
Dominance is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the auditing firm is the largest supplier of audit services and its 
market share is at least 10 percent greater than that of the second supplier, 0 otherwise (Balsam et al. 2003).  
 
Results reported in Table 6 are generally consistent with industry specialist auditors enhancing acquirer 
value on the announcement of mergers and acquisitions. Among the four industry specialization proxies, 
Audsp_Sale provides the most statistically significant association with stock market returns (t-value=2.92). All of 
remaining measures, excepting for Leader, provide qualitatively similar results. We also perform the regression 
estimation on a reduced sample with only Big N acquirers we find (Untabulated) qualitatively similar results.  
 
Table 6. Robustness Tests: Alternative Specialization Measures 
 Dependent Variable = ACAR 
 Audsp_Sale Leader Dominance Audsp_Client 
BigN -1.610*** -1.217** -1.101** -1.214** 
 (-2.60) (-2.00) (-1.89) (-2.06) 
Audsp_Sale 3.969***    
 (2.92)    
Leader  0.371   
  (1.23)   
Dominance   0.928**  
   (2.39)  
Audsp_Client    4.557*** 
    (2.64) 
B/M 0.213 0.206 0.224 0.218 
 (0.44) (0.43) (0.47) (0.45) 
ROA -2.883*** -2.852*** -2.846*** -2.843*** 
 (-2.43) (-2.40) (-2.39) (-2.40) 
Log(Analyst) -0.181* -0.182* -0.174 -0.168 
 (-1.30) (-1.30) (-1.24) (-1.20) 
Log(Tgt_TA) 0.147** 0.146** 0.143** 0.150** 
 (1.81) (1.80) (1.76) (1.86) 
Stock -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (-4.22) (-4.24) (-4.22) (-4.21) 
Cash_All 0.468* 0.446* 0.473* 0.455* 
 (1.48) (1.41) (1.50) (1.44) 
Pool -0.078 -0.100 -0.085 -0.089 
 (-0.14) (-0.18) (-0.15) (-0.16) 
Private 2.177*** 2.184*** 2.183*** 2.186*** 
 (6.41) (6.42) (6.44) (6.44) 
NIB -0.327** -0.320** -0.315** -0.320** 
 (-2.19) (-2.14) (-2.10) (-2.15) 
Inhouse 0.382 0.386 0.392 0.397 
 (1.03) (1.04) (1.05) (1.07) 
Indrel 0.293 0.273 0.284 0.285 
 (1.17) (1.09) (1.13) (1.14) 
Friendly -0.174 -0.185 -0.187 -0.180 
 (-0.36) (-0.38) (-0.39) (-0.37) 
Rel_Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.82) (0.87) (0.85) (0.97) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,283 4,283 4,283 4,283 
Adj. R-squared 0.070 0.068 0.069 0.069 
Notes: Dominance is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the auditing firm is the largest supplier of audit services and its market share is 
at least 10 percent greater than that of the second supplier (Balsam et al. 2003), 0 otherwise; Leader is a binary variable that is equal to 1 
for industry specialists, 0 otherwise. Industry specialists are identified as the largest auditor in each industry, as well as the second- and 
third-largest auditors in industries (Balsam et al. 2003); Audsp_Client is defined as the market share of the auditor measured in the 
number of clients in a two-digit industry (Balsam et al. 2003); Audsp_Sale is the market share of the auditor measured in client sales in a 
two-digit industry (Balsam et al. 2003). Other variable definitions are in Appendix 1. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent level in a one-tail test, respectively. T-values are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm 
clustering (Petersen 2009). Variable definitions are presented in Appendix. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, we posit that industry specialists provide higher quality assurance, monitoring and advisory 
services to their audit clients involved in acquisitions. Specifically, we examine whether the stock market reaction is 
higher to announcements of mergers and acquisitions of acquirers audited by industry specialists. The only study we 
are aware of that has examined the effect of external auditor choice on stock prices of acquirers around merger 
announcements is Louis (2005). He finds that acquirers audited by non-Big 4 accounting firms experience higher 
abnormal returns, supporting his hypothesis that non-Big 4 auditors possess superior knowledge of the local markets 
in which their clients make their acquisitions.  
 
In contrast to Louis, we examine differences in audit quality between industry specialist and non-specialist 
auditors. Louis results are limited to explaining variation in a relatively small percentage of the M&A deals. 
Specifically, the non-Big 4 only audit about 5 percent of all M&A acquisitions. Our study contributes to the 
literature because we study variation in abnormal returns within the remaining 95 percent of M&A deals. Our results 
show that the stock market reaction is more positive when the acquirer is audited by an industry specialist. This 
suggests that greater assurance and monitoring values provided by industry specialist audit firms. Consistent with  
expectations, we also find that markets perceive the value of industry specialist auditors to be greater when target 
firms are publicly traded, when the M&As rely more on stock financing, and there when no investment bankers are 
present and  stock financing is used. 
 
While there has been extensive research on mergers and acquisitions, there is still a lot to be understood 
about the value of these deals to investors. A significant amount of the stock market variation to announcements of 
M&A transactions has yet to be explained by research.  This study informs investors, regulators, investment bankers 
and practitioners on how the choice of an auditor affects shareholder wealth in mergers and acquisitions, which 
undoubtedly are very important events in the corporate finance world. Future work is needed on increasing our 
understanding of whether other measures of auditor expertise, for example auditor tenure, are useful in explaining 
stock market returns surrounding these events.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Variable Definition 
ACAR = percentage cumulative abnormal return of the bidder computed over the day of the merger 
announcement, the preceding day, and the day after (t = [-2,2]);  
BigN = a binary variable that is equal to one for clients of Big N audit firms and zero for clients of non-
Big N firms; 
Audsp_TA = the market share of the auditor i in industry k; 
Audsp_dum = a binary variable that is equal to 1 if Audsp_TA is greater than 20 percent during 1988-1997 (Big 
6 regime), 25 percent during 1998-2000 (Big 5 regime), and 30 percent during 2001-2011 (Big 4 
regime), 0 otherwise; 
Dominance = a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the auditing firm is the largest supplier of audit services and 
its market share is at least 10 percent greater than that of the second supplier (Balsam et al. 
2003), 0 otherwise; 
Leader = a binary variable that is equal to 1 for industry specialists, 0 otherwise, where industry 
specialists are identified as the largest auditor in each industry, as well as the second- and third-
largest auditors in industries (Balsam et al. 2003); 
Audsp_Client = the market share of the auditor measured in the number of clients in a two-digit industry 
(Balsam et al. 2003); 
Audsp_Sale = the market share of the auditor measured in client sales in a two-digit industry (Balsam et al. 
2003); 
B/M = acquirer’s book-to-market ratio; 
ROA = acquirer’s return-on-assets;  
Log(Analyst) = analyst coverage, measured by natural logarithm of the number of analysts forecasting the 
acquirer’s annual earnings in the month immediately prior to the earnings announcement; 
Log(Tgt_TA) = the natural logarithm of the target’s total assets; 
Stock = percentage of the transaction financed with common stock; 
Cash_All = a binary variable that is equal to one if the merger is financed entirely with cash and zero 
otherwise;  
Pool = a binary variable taking the value one if the merger is accounted for by the pooling-of-interest 
method and zero if it is accounted for by the purchase method;  
Private = a binary variable taking the value one is the target is a private company and zero otherwise; 
NIB = a proxy for the industry relatedness of the merging firms, is equal to one if the two merging 
partners are in the same three-digit SIC code and zero otherwise; 
Inhouse = a binary variable taking the value one if no investment banker is identified by SDC and zero 
otherwise; 
Indrel = a proxy for the industry relatedness of the merging firms, is equal to one if the two merging 
partners are in the same three-digit SIC code and zero otherwise; 
Friendly = one if the target’s attitude to the proposed merger is characterized as friendly by SDC, and zero 
otherwise; 
Rel_Size = relative size, is the ratio of the acquirer’s total assets to the target’s total assets; and 
Lambda = the inverse Mills ratio from the Probit model below. 
BigNit= µ0 + µ1Ln(Acq_TA) it + µ2Acq_Leverage it + µ3Acq_Cashit 
+ µ4Ret_Vol it + µ5Acq_EP it + µ6Acq_Regind it + µ7SOX it + ɛ it. 
 
where, Ln(Acq_TA)it is the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets (in million); 
Acq_Leverageit is the acquirer’s leverage defined as total liabilities divided by total assets; 
Acq_Cashit is the acquirer’s cash divided by total assets; Acq_EPit is the acquirer’s earnings-to-
price ratio; Ret_Volit is a measure of the acquirer’s pre-merger stock volatility proxied by the 
standard deviation of the acquirer’s return over the period from 60 to259 days before the merger 
announcement; Acq_Regindit is a binary variable taking the value one if the acquirer is in a 
regulated industry (SIC 60–69, and 49) and zero otherwise; and SOXit is a binary variable taking 
the value one if the announcement is made in 2003-2011and zero otherwise. 
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NOTES 
